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In  this  paper  we  use  detailed  employment  records  to  study  to  what  extent  sickness 
absence  among  work  group  colleagues  influences  individual  sickness  absence.  Our 
results  indicate  an  overall  positive  peer  effect.  However,  further  analysis  show  peer 
behavior  to  be  important  for  women’s  sickness  absence,  but  not  for  men’s,  and  that 
woman are only affected by their female co-workers. Our findings also suggest that it, on 
average,  takes  two  to  three  years  for  a  new  employee  to  become  influenced  by  the 
absence  pattern  of  the  work  group.  In  light  of  our results,  we  cannot  rule  out  the 
possibility of social norms being important to the individual sick leave decision. 
 
Keywords: Peer effects, sickness absence, social norms  
 
 





a. Corresponding author. Swedish Business School, Örebro University, 701 82 Örebro, 
Sweden. Email: mattias.bokenblom@oru.se. 
b. Swedish Business School, Örebro University, 701 82 Örebro, Sweden. Email: 




We  are  grateful  for  comments  from  seminar  participants  at  the  EEA  and  the  EALE 
conferences.  In  addition,  special  thanks  to  Assar  Lindbeck  and  Mats  Persson  for 
insightful  comments  and  suggestions.  Financial  support  from  the  Swedish  Social 
Insurance Agency is acknowledged.  1 
 
1 Introduction  
 
In spite of good health status and long life expectancy, the Swedish costs for sickness 
absence are among the highest in Western Europe (Alexanderson and Norlund, 2004). 
The level of these costs increased dramatically during the second half of the 1990s and 
despite a decrease in recent years, the level is still very high. In 2006, the expenses for the 
Swedish sickness insurance system, regarding absence due to illness, amounted to 34 




Many attempts have been made to identify the determinants of sickness absence. Most 
economic  studies  dealing  with  this  issue  have  focused  on  economic  incentives 
(Henreksson and Persson, 2004; Johansson and Palme, 1996, 2002, 2005; Brown et al., 
1999; Barmby et al., 1995), work place characteristics (Drago and Wooden, 1992; Arai 
and Skogman Thoursie, 2004; Ose, 2005) and macro economic fluctuations (Arai and 
Skogman Thoursie, 2005). Even though these determinants have been found important to 
the fluctuations in sickness absence, a remaining concern that cannot fully be explained 
by traditional models is the differences in patterns of sickness absence observed across 
and within regions and organizational units. One explanation, proposed in the literature, 
is  that people in  different  regions,  residential  areas  and work places tend to  develop 
different work norms which are reflected in the levels of sickness absence (Johns, 1994; 
Lindbeck et al., 2004; Larsson et al., 2005).   
 
The  importance  of  social  norms  in  economic  decision  making  has  attained  increased 
attention in recent years and is of particular importance to policy makers. The existence 
of social interactions implies that interventions, in addition to the direct effect, give rise 
to  indirect  effects  that  are  mediated  via  the  interplay  of  the  individuals  in  society. 
Estimation of social interactions often amounts to estimating how the behavior of the 
individual  is  affected  by  the  average  behavior  of  the  individual’s  reference  group 
(Manski, 1993). The results from these so called “peer effect studies” indicate that the 
                                                 
1 A brief presentation of the Swedish sickness insurance system can be found in the Appendix.  
2 The Swedish Social Insurance Agency.  2 
 
behavior of the group is important in individual decision making. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if the behavior of the peers is important to the 
individual  sick  leave  decision.  We  pursue  this  aim  by  estimating  to  what  extent  an 
individual’s share of sickness absence is influenced by the share of sickness absence of 
his/her colleagues. We also test if the peer effect is gender dependent and if it is affected 
by the length of employment. We adopt a methodology that is common practice in the 
peer effect literature.  
 
The  data  used  in  this  study  is  based  on  the  employment  records  obtained  from  the 
municipality of Örebro and contains yearly data for the period 2003 to 2006. In addition 
to the statistics on sickness absence exceeding fourteen days that is available in Swedish 
register data; our data also contains information about shorter spells of sickness absence.
3 
Furthermore, due to the highly informative data structure, each individual’s reference 
group can be identified on a very narrow level (work group). Thus, our data enables us to 
address the problem of confounding effects, often referred to as “the reflection problem” 
(Manski, 1993, 2000), and the problem of miss-specified peer groups.  
 
Our results show a positive peer effect on the individual’s share of sickness absence. 
However,  when  separating  the  measure  of  peer  behavior  across  gender  our  results 
indicate that peer behavior is only important to women. Regarding the dynamics of the 
peer effect, we find that individuals tend to gradually adapt to the sickness absence of the 
others in the group, a process which, as indicated by our results, takes two to three years. 
Based  on  our  results,  we  interpret  the  peer  effect  as  measuring  some  form  of  social 
interaction that is important to the individual sick leave decision. Hence, the direct effect 
of  policy  interventions  reducing  sickness  absence  could  be  amplified  due  to  the 
interaction among co-workers.  
 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 past research related to our 
study  is  reviewed.  Section  3  outlines  the  methodology  and  the  data  is  presented  in 
                                                 
3 Prior to 1992 Swedish register data also contained information on spells shorter than fourteen days. 3 
 
Section 4. The results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2 Past Research  
 
In the economic literature, incorporation of the social interplay in models for economic 
decision  making  is  still  a  relatively  new  phenomenon.  In  recent  years,  however,  the 
strand of literature combining economic decisions and social interactions has increased 
substantially  (see  Manski,  2000;  Dietz,  2002;  Soetevent,  2006,  for  reviews).  One 
common way to implement the concept of social interactions in economic models is to let 
the individual’s utility from taking an action depend on the actions taken by the reference 
group.  Even  though  it  is  theoretically  appealing  to  implement  the  notion  of  social 
interactions in economic models, it is a rather challenging task to estimate the effect 
empirically (Manski, 2000). Lindbeck and Persson (2008) incorporate social norms in 
their  theoretical  model  regarding  individual  absence  behavior.  In  their  theoretical 
framework the social norm, working instead of living off benefits, is taken as given. 
Individuals acting in a way that does not conform to the norm, i.e. living off benefits, are 
being stigmatized. The strength of the norm, and hence the magnitude of the social cost 
inflicted on absent individuals, is allowed to be either exogenous or endogenous in the 
model. In the case of endogenous norms the strength of the norm depends on the number 
of people being absent. The discomfort felt by the individual living off benefits is higher 
(lower) when the proportion of people upholding the norm is high (low). The individuals 
make their decision about working or not, taking the behavior of all other individuals into 
consideration. Individual behavior is thus amplified by group influence.   
 
Despite empirical difficulties, a growing number of studies estimating the existence of 
peer effects are emerging in economic literature. So far, most studies measuring peer 
effects  concern  either  educational  achievements  (e.g.,  Aaronson,  1998;  Hoxby,  2000; 
Sacerdote, 2001; Hanushek et al., 2003) or adolescent substance use (e.g., Norton et al., 
1998;  Gaviria  and  Raphael,  2001;  Powell  et  al.,  2005;  Lundborg,  2006;  Clark  and 
Lohéac,  2007).  In  addition  there  also  some  studies  regarding  peer  effects  and  labor 4 
 
productivity (e.g., Ichino and Falk, 2006); Mas and Moretti, 2009). The importance of 
social interactions regarding sickness absence, on the other hand, has received limited 
attention. Lindbeck et al. (2008) present a theoretical model that combines the impact of 
economic incentives and social norms. The basic assumption in the model establishes that 
the social norm is to live off one’s own work. Individuals who instead live off welfare are 
experiencing disutility from breaking the norm. This expected disutility is assumed to 
vary negatively with the population share living off welfare. Lindbeck et al. (2004) use 
variance analysis to investigate differences in sick leave patterns across residential areas, 
as well as across work places. They conclude that the existence of social norms affecting 
the individual sick leave decision cannot be ruled out. Moreover, their results indicate 
that social interactions in the work place are particularly important. Using a data set on 
individuals  working  for  an  Italian  bank,  Ichino  and  Maggi  (2000)  investigate  work 
absence differentials between workers in southern and northern Italy. They find that there 
are different cultures emerging in the north and in the south, causing the probability of an 
individual being absent to vary between the two regions. Furthermore, they find that 
individuals  that  move  from  one  branch  to  another  change  their  absence  behavior  in 
accordance with the absence culture in the new branch. Recent work by Lindbeck et al. 
(2007)  proposes  several  identification  strategies  to  establish  the  existence  of  social 
interactions  on  the  neighborhood  level.  Irrespective  of  identifying  assumption,  their 
results indicate the importance of social interactions in the individual sick leave decision. 
Hesselius et al. (2008, 2009) utilize a randomized social experiment, that reduces the 
monitoring of sickness absence, in order to identify how individuals influence each others 
sick leave decision. Their results show a strong interaction effect within ethnical groups 
as well as within work places.  
 
In sociology, social psychology and in organizational theory the importance of social 
norms  in  individual  decision  making  has  long  been  emphasized.  Individuals  are 
acknowledged  to  be  directly  and  indirectly  influenced  by  the  thoughts,  values  and 
behavior of their co-workers (Kelley, 1952). In particular, perceived norms are found to 
correlate positively with actual behavior. In this strand of literature two concepts have 
come  to  play  a  central  role:  cohesion  and  demographic  conformity.  The  cooperative 5 
 
behavior in a group is found to be positively correlated to the cohesion of the group 
(Kidwell  et  al.,  1997;  Sanders  and  Nauta,  2004).  In  turn,  cohesion  depends  on 
demographic conformity. Groups with similar demographic characteristics are plausible 
to  have  stronger  cohesion  than  groups  with  relatively  more  diverse  demographic 
characteristics. It has been shown that demographic diversity decreases communication 
and social contact within a group (Blau, 1977; O’Reilly et al., 1988). It may, in fact, 
cause subgroups to emerge (Lau and Murnigham, 1998) where the cohesion within the 
subgroup is expected to be strong but the cohesion in the group as a whole is expected to 
be weak. The subgroups are usually formed on the basis of demographic attributes (age, 
gender, race etc.) reflecting the fact that individuals have a propensity to interact and 
bond with peers that are similar to themselves (Louch, 2000; Sanders and Nauta, 2004). 
Regarding dynamics of group behavior, research has shown that the process of group 
socialization consists of several steps and that new workers need time to adjust to the 
norms and the behavior of the new group. This implies that the time it takes for an 
individual to adapt to the group behavior can vary from one individual and group to the 
next and from one situation to another (see Saks and Ashforth, 1997, for a review).  
 
 
3 Methodology  
 
3.1 The Models  
The empirical model (Model 1) is given by 
 
(1)  , iga i ga iga sS            iga a a X Y D , 
 
where  iga s  is the sickness absence for individual  i in work group  g  at work place  a . 
, i ga S   is the average sickness absence, in work group g   at  workplace  a ,  excluding 
individual  i.  iga X  denotes a vector of personal characteristics,  a Y  represents a vector of 
work place characteristics and   a D  denotes a vector of  work place dummies.  Finally, 
iga   is the error term.   6 
 
In order to incorporate the insights from research in sociology and social psychology 
regarding  group  behavior,  Model  1  is  rewritten  to  allow  peer  behavior  to  vary  with 
gender. The corresponding empirical model (Model 2) is given by: 
 
(2)  iga s   f fga m mga f f fga m f mga iga S S d S d S                iga a a X Y D         
 
In Model 2  fga S  is the female average sickness absence, in work group  g  at workplace a  
excluding individual  i,  mga S  is the male average sickness absence, in work groupg  at 
workplace  a  excluding individual  i, and  f d  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
individual i is a woman.  
 
In line with the insights from social psychology about the dynamics of social interactions 
we  extend  our  model  to  allow  the  peer  effect to  differ  with  respect  to  the  time  the 
individual has been employed in a specific work group. The model (Model 3) takes the 
following form: 
 
(3)  iga s   , g t t i ga iga
t
S d S              iga a a X Y D , 
 
where  t d  is a dummy variable indicating if the individual started in the work group in 
year t,  2003,...,2006 t  . 
 
3.2 Empirical challenges 
The difficulties with empirically estimating social interactions have been given much 
attention  in  the  literature  and  many  attempts  have  been  made  to  overcome  the 
econometric challenges. In the influential work by Manski (1993, 1995), the problem of 
identification is discussed. Manski identifies three types off effects that may cause the 
individual and the group behavior to correlate; endogenous effects, exogenous effects and 
correlated effects. The endogenous effect refers to idea that the propensity of an agent to 
behave in some way varies with the behavior of the group. Exogenous effects imply that 7 
 
the propensity of an agent to behave in some way varies with characteristics of the group 
members.  Correlated  effects  refer to  the idea that  agents  in  the same  group tend to 
behave  similarly  because  they  have  similar  individual  characteristics  or  face  similar 
institutional environments. The difficulty of separating these three effects is known as the 
reflection problem. In addition to the problem of identification that is general to all peer 
effect studies, there are also certain methodological problems specific to studies on peer 
effects regarding sickness absence. In the following we address both general and specific 
empirical challenges associated with our study.  
 
 Correlated effects   
When discussing correlated effects in the peer effects literature, two concepts relevant to 
our study are often mentioned: the problem of unobservable institutional characteristics 
and the problem of sorting. In our setting, unobservable institutional characteristics could 
include factors such as  working  conditions  and quality of management. Consider for 
instance the case of poor working conditions. Poor working conditions are likely to have 
a negative impact on the general health status of the workers and are, consequently, likely 
to  affect  the  sickness  absence  of  both  the  individual  and  his/her  peers.  In  our  study 
sorting could also be problematic if individuals with similar characteristics, important to 
the sick leave decision, self-select into specific work places or work groups. In previous 
studies, the problem of correlated effects has been dealt with in primarily two ways. 
Ichino and Maggi (2000) and Gaviria and Raphael (2001) use a large number of control 
variables while Lundborg (2006), Soetevent and Kooreman (2007) and Clark and Lohéac 
(2007) employ fixed effects. Following the latter, work place fixed effects are employed 
to control for heterogeneity across work places. Moreover, we believe that workers may 
indeed  self-select  into  work  places.  However,  given  the  nature  of  the  municipality’s 
hiring process and how the workers are organized the possibility for workers to self-
select  into  work  groups  is  much  more  limited.  Thus,  in  addition  to  controlling  for 
heterogeneity across work places, including work place fixed effects also deals with the 
problem of sorting.  
 
Correlated effects specific to research regarding sickness absence includes the existence 8 
 
of contagious diseases and the possibility of an increased work load (as a consequence of 
an  individual  being  absent)  leading  to  more  absence  among  remaining  co-workers. 
Contagious diseases and increased work load due to absence, affecting all individuals in a 
work group simultaneously, may also cause a spurious correlation between the group and 
the individual.  In order to  address  the concern of overestimation  due to  existence of 
contagious diseases and problems concerning increased work load within work groups, 
we use the results from Model 2 and Model 3. First of all, separating the peer effect 
across gender as in Model 2 is a mean of testing the possibility of the peer effect only 
reflecting correlation due to increased work load. Assuming that the increased work load 
is evenly distributed among colleagues, correlation due to increased work load could be 
expected to be equal across gender and age, respectively. Secondly, the data allows us to 
identify when an individual started working for the municipality (Model 3). This gives us 
a mean to determine whether peer behavior affects all individuals equally, irrespective of 
when  they  started  working.  If  the  peer  effect  only  were  to  reflect  correlation  due  to 
contagious diseases, the effect could be expected to be fairly equal across groups (or 
possibly,  because  of  the  time  it  takes  to  adapt  to  new  bacteria,  larger  the  later  an 
individual started his/her work).  
 
Contextual effects 
As in many other peer effect studies we believe the problem of contextual effects to be 
negligible (Powell et al., 2005; Lundborg, 2006). More specifically, we do not find it 
likely  that  the  individual  sickness  absence  is  affected  directly  by  background 
characteristics of the peers. Rather, we believe this impact to be mediated via the sickness 
absence of the peers, thus, giving rise to endogenous and not contextual effects. 
 
Endogeneity  
Social  interactions  are  bi-directional  by  nature,  thus  peer  behavior  is  endogenous. 
Estimating the peer effects  model without taking this  into  consideration may lead to 
biased estimates. In the peer effects literature several methods to come to term with the 
endogeneity  problem  have  been  applied:  the  use  of  instrumental  variables,  model 
specifications with non-linearities in the relationship between the behavior of the group 9 
 
and the behavior of the individual, and the use of a lagged measure of peer behavior. 
Having access to data over several years, we follow Hanushek et al. (2003) and Clark and 
Lohéac (2007) and use lagged peer behavior when estimating Model 1-3.
4 Identification 
relies on the assumption that present individual behavior does not affect past group 
behavior.  
 
Miss-specified reference groups  
Another important issue when estimating peer effects is to identify the reference group 
relevant to the individual. Due to lack of detailed data, researchers are unlikely to know 
who actually interacts with whom and they are often forced to specify reference groups at 
very  broad  levels.  For  instance,  reference  groups  have  been  formed  to  include  all 
residents in a neighborhood, all students in the same school or grade or all workers at a 
work  place.  One  of  the  strengths  with  our  data  is  the  highly  detailed  information 
concerning work place organization. For each individual worker, we are able to identify 
his/her colleagues on different work group levels. Consequently, our data allows us to 
study the effect of social interactions in reference groups close to the individual. There is, 
however, one potential problem when reference groups become too small. In contrast to 
reference groups that are too wide, we may instead get reference groups that are too 
narrow, hence excluding individuals that are indeed influential to the individual. This 
kind of measurement error may lead too attenuation bias in the estimates. In order to 
check the robustness of our results estimations are performed on two different sets of 
work groups. The sets of work groups are based on different levels in the organizational 
structure.  
 
   
                                                 
4  We  have  also  performed  IV  estimations  using  peer  background  characteristics  as  instruments.  In 
resemblance with other peer effect studies the IV estimates are substantially larger than the OLS estimates 
(Ichino  and  Maggi,  2000;  Lundborg,  2006;  Trogdon  et  al.,  2008).  There  is  however  no  qualitative 
difference between the IV and the OLS estimates. The reliability of the IV estimations relies heavily on 
the quality of the instruments. In our study the correlation between the instruments and the peer behavior 
is low, hence,  we  have chosen  not to present  the IV estimates in the paper. They can, however, be 
provided on request.  10 
 
4 Data  
 
The data used in this study is based on the employment records for the 50 largest work 
places run by the municipality of Örebro. The information has been provided by the 
department of human resources at Örebro municipality. The employment records hold 
information  about  all  individuals  working  for  the  municipality,  their  individual 
characteristics, employment, and different kinds of work absence.
5
 Contrary to national 
register data, the employment records hold information on all spells of sickness absence, 
not just those that exceed 14 days. Our data set contains yearly data for the period 2003 to 
2006. The data is restricted only to include employees receiving a monthly salary and 
having worked more than 90 days during 2006. Furthermore, individuals in labor market 
programs are excluded from the data set.  
 
The full data set for 2006 consists of 5 175 employees. The employees are organized into 
five different sectors:  City Administration (CA), Child Ca re and Education (CCE), 
Culture and Tourism (CT), Central Planning (CP) and Health Care and Nursing (HCN). 
There are a number of different work places in each sector. Examples of work places are 
preschools, schools, libraries and nursing homes. The average work place in our sample 
consists of 103 workers. Each work place is sub divided into several work groups.
6
 A 
work group is defined as a group of workers that have frequent contact and a common 
task to perform. An example of a work group is a team of teachers that are responsible for 
certain classes at a particular school. However, work groups can sometimes be defined on 
several levels. A team of teachers may for instance be divided into sub groups depending 
on what subject(s) they teach. The number of wor k groups used in the analysis thus 
depends on what level the work groups are defined. Our analysis is primarily based on a 
decomposition  of  workers  into  388  work  groups  with  an  average  of  13  workers. 
However, we also use a more narrow decomposition that yields 690 work groups with an 
                                                 
5  The data includes age, gender, residential area, wage, employment type, rate of employment, sickness 
benefits, parental leave, temporary parental leave, educational leave and leave of absence.  
6  The employment records enabled identification of approximately 350  work  groups. For  most  work 
places within the sector Child Care and Education work group information was missing and had to be 
collected manually. 11 
 
average of 8 workers.  
 
The dependent variable  
The  dependent  variable  is  work  absence  due  to  illness.  Due  to  the  fact  that  the 
individuals’ potential work days vary substantially across individuals and work groups, 
the  number  of  days  on  sick  leave  as  the  dependent  variable  is  potentially  rather 
problematic.
7
 In order to overcome this problem, our measure of work absence is defined 
as the fraction of days on sick leave, i.e., the number of days on sick leave as compared to 
the number of potential work days, where the potential work days for an individual is 
computed as:  i PW  = (days of employment * rate of employment) – (days of parental 
leave + days of educational leave + days of leave of absence). This measure enables 
comparison between individuals with, possibly, different lengths of employment.  
 
Peer measure 
Due to the informative data structure in terms of organization of individuals, we are able 
to construct a measure reflecting peer behavior on a very detailed level. Our measure of 
peer  behavior  is  the  share  of  absence  due  to  illness  in  the  work  group,  excluding 





i g jg jg
j j i j j i
S S PW 
   
    
 
where   jg S  is number of days on sick leave for individual  j  in group  g ,  jg PW  is the 
number of potential work days for individual  j  in group  g  and  g N   is the number of 
workers in work group  g . In Model 2 peer behavior is separated across gender.  
 
Control variables  
In addition to the variables reflecting sickness absence, the data set contains several other 
                                                 
7  Potential work days are defined as the total number of working days during a time period, excluding 
parental leave educational leave and leave of absence.  12 
 
individual  and  work  place  specific  variables  that  could  potentially  influence  the 
individual’s sick leave decision. Our control variables include individual characteristics 
and work place characteristics. The individual variables are age, gender, monthly salary, 
type of employment, rate of employment, profession, residential area and sector.  
 
Descriptive statistics  




Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
  Mean 
(St dev) 
Variables  Total   Men   Women 
Dependent variables
a        












On sick leave (1=on sick leave during 2006)  0.64  0.47  0.70 






Control variables       












Gender (1=woman)  0.74  0  1 
Term of employment (1=permanent)  0.87  0.86  0.88 




0.92     
(0.13) 
New worker (1=started working during 2006)  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Mover (1=changed working place during 2006)  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Residential area       
Concrete suburb (1=Concrete suburb)  0.08  0.07  0.08 
Block of flats (1= Block of flats)  0.31  0.32  0.31 
Residential area (1= Residential area)  0.33  0.34  0.32 
Country side (1= Country side)  0.28  0.28  0.29 
Sector       
City Administration (1= City Administration)  0.02  0.03  0.01 
Child Care and Eduacation (1= Child Care and Eduacation)  0.37  0.51  0.32 
Culture and Tourism (1= Culture and Tourism)  0.03  0.04  0.03 
                                                 
8   The work force characteristics in Swedish municipalities differ from those in the private sector and in 
other  parts  of  the  public  sector.  The  differences  are  particularly  large  regarding  the  share  of  female 
workers, the average wage level and the average level of education. According to Statistics Sweden the 
fraction of women in the Swedish labor force in 2006 was 0.47. The average monthly salary amounted to 
25 000 SEK in the same year, and the share of the workers with post-secondary education was 0.36. The 
work  force  characteristics  in  Örebro  municipality  are,  however,  similar  to  those  in  other  Swedish 
municipalities.  13 
 
Central Planning (1=Central Planning)  0.10  0.26  0.04 
Health Care and Nursing (1= Health Care and Nursing)  0.48  0.16  0.60 
Number of observations  5 175  1 361  3 815 
 
a. Note that “Share of sickness absence” is the only dependent variable used in the regressions. “Days of 
sickness absence”, “Sickness absence”, and  ”Potential work days” are only auxiliary variables.  
 
The average share of sickness absence in the full sample is 0.076, which corresponds to 
22 days on sick leave per year. Rather striking is the large difference between male and 
female workers. The female average share of sick leave is more than twice as large as the 
male average share of sick leave. This is mainly due to a larger share of female workers 
being on long term sick leave. Moreover, a larger fraction of the women has been on sick 
leave during the  given  time period.  In addition to  the gender differences  in  sickness 
absence, data reveals that male workers have higher average wages and higher average 
rate of employment.  
 
5 Results  
 
5.1 Peer effects  
The  results  from  the  OLS  estimations  of  Model  1-3  are  reported  in  Table  2.  All 
regressions use lagged peer behavior.
 9 
  
In  column  one  and  two  estimations  of  Model  1  are  presented.  The  only  difference 
between Model 1a and Model 1b is the sizes of the peer groups, where Model 1b uses the 
somewhat larger groups. The estimated peer effects are positive, with a magnitude of 
0.13 and 0.21, respectively. The interpretation of the most restrictive estimate is that an 
individual’s sickness absence is expected to increase by 0.13 days if the average sickness 
absence of his or her peers increases by one day.  
 
The result from Model 2, where peer behavior is separated across gender, is presented in 
column three. Our results indicate that the peer effect is different across gender. Peer 
behavior seems to be important to women but not to men. However, women are only 
                                                 
9 In all regressions the lag length is t-1. Using different lag lengths (t-2 and t-3) yield qualitatively similar 
results. 14 
 
affected  by  the  behavior  of  their  female  peers  and  not  by  the  behavior  of  male  co-
workers. The estimated effect of female peers on female workers is 0.16. 
 
The  result  from  Model  3  reveals  that  the  peer  effect  varies  across  individuals  with 
different lengths of employment. As can be seen in column four the estimated peer effect 
for individuals having started work before 2003 is 0.25. The peer effect for individuals 
having started work in 2003 or 2004 is not statistically different. However, for those 
individuals  having  started  work  during  2005  or  2006,  the  peer  effect  is  significantly 
smaller  than  for  those  having  started  work  before  2003.  Our  interpretation  of  the 
estimates is that the behavior of the individual gradually adapts to the behavior of the 
group. As indicated by our results this adaptation seems to take about two to three years.  
 
Table 2: The effect of peer behavior on individual sickness absence 
 
Variables  OLS 
Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2  Model 3 




  0.25*** 
(0.04) 
Women’s peer behavior 
on women 
    0.16** 
(0.07) 
 
Women’s peer behavior 
on men 
    -0.02  
(0.06) 
 
Men’s peer behavior on 
women 
    -0.08 
(0.08) 
 
Men’s peer behavior on 
men 
    0.01  
(0.04) 
 
Peer behavior * started 
working 2003 
      -0.09 
(0.13) 
Peer behavior * started 
working 2004 
      -0.06 
(0.13) 
Peer behavior * started 
working 2005 
      -0.27*** 
(0.06) 
Peer behavior * started 
working 2006 
      -0.26*** 
(0.26) 
Age  8.92e-04*** 
(2.68e-04) 
8.39e-04***                      
(2.71e-04) 
6.39e-04***                      
(3.17e-04) 
7.82e-04***                      
(2.76e-04) 
Monthly salary  -2.78e-06***  
(8.85e-07)                    
-2.76e-06***                       
(8.60e-07) 
-1.71e-06*                      
(9.83e-07) 
-3.15e-06***                       
(9.53e-07) 
Gender  0.03***          
(4.54e-03)                     
0.03***                         
(4.54e-03) 
0.01*                        
(7.05e-03) 
0.03***                         
(5.00e-03) 
Terms of employment  0.04***           
(6.40e-03)                     
0.05***                       
(6.70e-03) 
0.04***                       
(7.85e-03) 
0.04***                       
(6.59e-03) 
Employment rate  -0.12***             
(0.03)                  
-0.13***                       
(0.03) 
-0.13***                       
(0.03) 
-0.13***                       
(0.03) 
New worker  -0.02***         
(6.55e-03)                   
-0.02***                     
(6.55e-03) 
-0.02**                  
(7.06e-03) 
-5.50e-03**                  
(7.10e-03) 15 
 
Mover  7.86e-03                              
(0.01) 
0.01                       
(0.01) 
0.01                     
(0.01) 
0.01                     
(0.01) 
Residential areas  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sectors  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupational dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Work place fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No of work groups  690  388  212  388 




5.2 Sensitivity analysis  
Outliers, the large number of very small work groups and the large fraction of employees 
that either started working in, or changed to a new work group within the municipality 
during 2006 are factors that may potentially affect the results. In Table 3 Model 1b is re-
estimated taking each of these factors into consideration.
10 The estimated peer effect is 
positive in all regressions with coefficients that range from 0.16 to 0.21.  
 




Outliersa  Small work groupsb   Newcomersc  






Number of observations   4 415  4 602  4558 
Number of work groups   337   344   386 
Note: Clustered and robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. (***) and (**) indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
a. Work groups with at least one individual having a share of sickness absence above 0.95 are removed 
from the sample  
b. Work groups with fewer than five workers are dropped from the sample.  




                                                 




This  paper  contributes  to  the  strand  of  empirical  literature  on  how  peer  behavior 
influences individual sickness absence. Detailed employment records allow us to identify 
work groups as well as work places. By introducing fixed effects on the work place level, 
when estimating work group peer effects, we can control for institutional factors on the 
work place level. Work place fixed effects also provides a mean to deal with the problem 
of sorting of employees across work places.  Furthermore, we have access to data on 
sickness  absence  for  several  years.  This  allows  us  to,  at  least  partially,  address  the 
problem of endogeneity by using lagged peer behavior. 
 
The  results  in  our  study  indicate  that  the  peer  effect  regarding  sickness  absence  is 
positive. In effect, an increase in the average sickness absence among peers is expected to 
increase the individual sickness absence.  The estimated peer effects range between 0.13 
and 0.21. When the peer effect is differentiated across gender, we find that peer behavior 
is  important  to  women  but  not  to  men.  However,  women  are  only  affected  by  the 
behavior of their female peers and not by the behavior of male co-workers. Furthermore, 
our results indicate that it, on average, takes two to three years for new employees to 
adapt to the absence pattern of the peers. The asymmetric pattern of the peer effect with 
respect to gender and with respect to length of employment leads us to believe that our 
estimates do not only reflect correlation due to contagious diseases and increased work 
load.  Rather, this pattern strengthens our belief that the estimated peer effects reflect the 
importance of social interplay between individuals.  
 
In  conclusion,  our  results  indicate  that  the  behavior  of  the  peers  is  important  to  the 
individual sickness absence, hence, we cannot rule out the importance of social norms. 
As a consequence, policy interventions intended to reduce sickness absence could be 
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The Swedish sickness insurance system  
The Swedish sickness insurance system is mandatory and covers all employed and self-
employed workers in Sweden. The insurance system provides economic compensation in 
the event of work incapacity exceeding 25% of full time. In Sweden a worker can be on 
sick  leave  25%,  50%,  75%  or  100%  of  full  time.  The  responsibility  of  providing 
economic compensation is shared between the employer and the Swedish government. 
The first part of the sickness spell, from day two to day fourteen, is paid for by the 
employer. (No compensation is paid the first day of the sickness spell. This is the so 
called waiting period.) The government is responsible for any additional time of sickness 
absence. The money paid by the Swedish government is mediated via the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency. Up to a certain limit, the sickness benefit corresponds to 80% of the 
individual  monthly  salary.  Above  the  cap,  the  compensation  is  fixed  to  80%  of  the 
amount of the limit. In December 2006 the cap was 33 100 SEK (approximately 4000 
USD).  
 
In addition to benefits paid by the Swedish insurance system, some employees receive 
supplementary compensation from their employers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 